邢唷> dgc欹 >nbjbj肳肳 *~==f9::8$&  <(ddd???$!`$?????dd?bdd?d!扣參0& $~$$x??????????& ????$?????????: Z: Thomas Aquinas on Creation and an Eternal UniverseWilliam E. Carroll Thomas Aquinas Fellow in Theology and Science, Blackfriars University of OxfordShanghai, October 2013One of the more radical sentences written in the Latin Middle Ages is Thomas Aquinas' affirmation that "not only does faith hold that there is creation, reason also demonstrates it." He wrote this in the mid-1250s in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. It was the first of four times in which he addressed the subject of creation in a sustained, magisterial way. What it means for God to create was a constant concern for Thomas. Indeed, Josef Pieper, the great German philosopher of the last century, observed that an understanding of creation is the key to Thomas' entire intellectual project. While here in Shanghai I will give two lectures on Thomas' understanding of the relationship between creation and science. In today's lecture I will provide an introduction to Thomas' understanding of the doctrine of creation, especially in its mediaeval context. Then, in the following lecture, tomorrow morning, I will use Thomas' analysis to discuss questions arising with respect to contemporary cosmological theories. In tomorrow's lecture I will repeat some of the themes I develop in today's lecture. I want to show how Thomas' thought is especially relevant today. A particularly good way to introduce Thomas' thought on creation is to locate it in the context of a major intellectual debate in the 13th Century a debate associated with the rediscovery of the works of Aristotle and their translation into Latin. The debate concerns the relationship between the doctrine of creation and the question of the eternity of the world. One of the common themes inherited from Greek and Roman culture was the widespread affirmation that the world is eternal. From the Patristic era on, Christians were confronted with the intellectual patrimony of antiquity which embraced the view of an eternal universe. It was a view set forth in its most sophisticated form in Aristotelian science. How ought one to regard the thought of Aristotle if, as a believer one is committed to the view that world is not eternal, that there is an absolute beginning to the universe? Does creation ex nihilo necessarily mean that the universe is not eternal? As we examine Thomas' role in this debate we will be able to see the fundamental features of his understanding of creation. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council solemnly proclaimed that God created all that is, matter and spirit, earth and angels, from nothing [de nihil condidit], and that this creation occurred ab initio temporis: "We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only on true God, . . . one origin [principium] of all things: Creator of all things, visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; who by His own omnipotent power from the beginning of time [ab initio temporis] all at once made out of nothing [de nihil condidit] both orders of creation, spiritual and corporeal, that is, the angelic and the earthly . . ." In this, the first conciliar statement on creation, the Council Fathers were especially concerned to reject any form of Manicheanism, in its modern Albigensian version, which would identify matter with evil or speak of more than one absolutely first principle of all that is. Following in the tradition of the Church Fathers, the Council also sought to make clear that there was a temporal beginning to the universe. In 1270 and again in 1277, the Bishop of Paris, 蓆ienne Tempier, following the advice of his theologians, issued a list of propositions condemned as heretical, among them the claim that the universe is eternal. Questions concerning creation and the eternity of the world were lively topics throughout the thirteenth century, especially at the new universities. These questions and others were part of a wide-ranging discourse concerning the relationship between the heritage of classical antiquity and Christianity. Although issues concerning the relationship between reason and faith were not new in the 13th century, the recently translated works of Aristotle provided an arsenal of arguments which appeared at least to be contrary to the truths of Christianity. The authority of Aristotle, whom Dante would call "the master of those who know," made the challenges seem even more formidable. In particular, how is one to reconcile -- or ought one even to try to reconcile -- the claim found throughout the texts of Aristotle, that the world is eternal, with the Christian doctrine of creation, understood, as the Fourth Lateran Council said, to include the notion of the beginning of time? Bishop Tempier and his theologians were especially concerned that members of the arts faculty at the University of Paris were too often addressing subjects (such as creation) which were properly within the domain of theology, and, at worst, were embracing heterodox views. These theologians feared that perhaps too great a reverence for Greek philosophy, and in particular for Aristotle, could have dangerous consequences for Christian belief. Indeed, on several occasions earlier in the century, there were abortive attempts to prohibit the teaching of Aristotelian texts at Paris. From his earliest to his last writings on the subject, St. Thomas Aquinas maintains that it is possible for there to be an eternal, created universe. Thomas, adhering to the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council and the tradition established by the Church Fathers, believes that the universe is not eternal. But he thinks that God could have created a universe which is eternal. Although reason affirms the intelligibility of an eternal, created universe, Thomas thought that reason alone leaves unresolved the question of whether or not the universal is eternal. The development by Thomas of an understanding of creation ex nihilo, and in particular, his understanding of the possibility of an eternal, created universe, offers, I think, one of the best examples of Thomas' account of the relationship between faith and reason. In fact, his magisterial treatment of the doctrine of creation is one of the enduring accomplishments of the thirteenth century. It is an accomplishment which sets him apart from his predecessors and his contemporaries. It is important to realize that Thomas predecessors included not only the Church Fathers, such as Augustine, but also Anselm, as well as Muslim and Jewish thinkers such as Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides. There are two distinct, but related, features of Thomas' analysis of creation which are of fundamental importance: first, his understanding of how God's creative act is fully consistent with there being real causes in the natural order -- and hence, consistent with a science of nature and a science of ethics; and second, the distinction he draws between creation understood philosophically and creation understood theologically. It is this latter distinction which enables him to affirm the intelligibility of an eternal created universe. Let me offer a few comments about the first topic: God's creative agency and the existence of real causes in nature: it will be a topic of particular importance when, in my third lecture I discuss the relationship between God's creative agency and evolutionary biology. Already among some mediaeval Islamic thinkers, notably the kalam theologians, God's sovereignty as Creator of all that is required the denial of any other type of agent cause. If God is omnipotent especially as disclosed in the act of creation then there would seem to be no role for any other cause. God's sovereignty absorbs, as it were, all causal agency. So, in a famous example, when fire is burning a piece of cloth, it is only God who can truly be said to be the cause of the burning; the fire is a mere instrument. Finding the kalam understanding of God as creator unacceptable, Averroes, the great commentator on Aristotle, rejected the strict sense of creation ex nihilo because he felt this doctrine denies any real natural causation in the universe. If effects could be produced from absolutely nothing then, according to Averroes, "anything whatever might proceed from anything whatever, and there would be no congruity between causes and effects." He thought that creation means God's eternally converting potentialities into actual existents. It seemed clear to many that one had to choose between a robust notion of creation ex nihilo and the existence of real causes in nature. Thomas, however, thought that, with a proper metaphysical understanding of God's creative act -- and especially that divine causality operates on a different metaphysical level from that of creatures -- there was no reason to reject creation ex nihilo in defense of reason and science, nor to reject reason and science in order to embrace creation ex nihilo. It is important to recognize that Thomas does not think that God allows creatures to be causes; God does not somehow withdraw to make room, so to speak, for creaturely causality (including human freedom). Rather, God causes creatures to be the kinds of causes which they are. Creaturely causality is an example of the exercise of divine omnipotence, not somehow a lessening or restriction of it. There are large philosophical issues lurking behind these brief statements. Without a proper understanding, both of how "cause" is analogically predicated (among creatures and with respect to the Creator) and of what is meant by divine transcendence, these issues would remain intractable. Again, these are issues to which I will return in my next two lectures. Just as it seemed to some that a universe created ex nihilo was a universe without any real natural causes, so it seemed to many, as well, that an eternal universe could not be a created universe. Yet, for Thomas the world can be eternal, created ex nihilo, and susceptible to scientific understanding. The doctrine of creation does not destroy the autonomy of that which is created: created beings can and do function as real secondary causes, causes which can be discovered in the natural sciences. Here, now, we are already moving into the second, and main topic: the intelligibility of a universe created and eternal. For Thomas, an eternal universe does not have to mean, as some, in the Neoplatonic tradition, argued, a necessary universe, a universe which is not the result of the free creative act of God. There was in this Neoplatonic context a temptation to view creation as a necessary emanation from a divine source of being. For Thomas, an eternal, created universe would have no first moment of its existence, but it still would have a cause of its existence. Furthermore, for Thomas an eternal universe would still be the result of a free divine choice. What is particularly impressive, as we shall see, is the role Aquinas gives to reason in his analysis of creation. Thomas' own teacher, Albert the Great, denied that reason could come to a satisfactory understanding of creation. It ought to be said that creation is properly a divine work. To us, moreover, it seems to be astounding in that we cannot conclude to it because it is not subject to a demonstration of reason [eo quod non possumus in id, quia non subiacet demonstrationi rationis]. And so not even the philosophers have known it, unless perchance someone [should have known something] from the sayings of the Prophets. But no one ever investigated it through demonstration [sed per demonstrationem nullus umquam investigavit ipsum]. Albert, II Sent. 1.A.8 (Borgnet, 27.22)Bonaventure, Thomas' famous colleague at the University of Paris, although he is often mistakenly thought to have claimed that one can demonstrate that the world is temporally finite and thus created out of nothing, makes fundamentally the same point, observing that the truth of creation, although "clear to any believer, has nevertheless lain hidden from philosophical wisdom." Where philosophy has failed, Bonaventure notes, Scripture has come to our aid, revealing that "all things have been created and produced into being according to all that they are." Reason does not contradict the faith on this matter; all attempts to show that the world is not created can be shown to be non-demonstrative. Thomas agrees with Bonaventure that any proposed demonstration that the world is not created fails, but he goes further to claim: "Not only does faith hold that there is creation, but reason also demonstrates it." [Respondeo quod creationem esse non tantum fides tenet, sed etiam ratio demonstrat.] This text, to which I have already referred in my introductory remarks, is from his Writings on the 'Sentences' of Peter Lombard, composed during the early stages of his career at the University of Paris [1250's]. It is, as I also mentioned, the first of four times in which Thomas addresses the topic of creation in a magisterial way. It is surely one of the more radical claims of the 13th century (or perhaps of any century). In his Writings on the 'Sentences', Thomas says: "the meaning of creation includes two things. The first is that it presupposes nothing in the thing which is said to be created . . . . And [second], since the causality of the Creator extends to everything that is in the thing . . . therefore, creation is said to be out of nothing, because nothing uncreated pre-exists creation." In discussing how to understand the priority of non-being to being in the thing which is created, he writes: "This is not a priority of time or of duration, such that what did not exist before does exist later, but a priority of nature, so that, if the created thing is left to itself, it would not exist, because it only has being from the causality of a higher cause." If these two points are sufficient for the meaning of creation, he concludes, then "creation can be demonstrated and in this way philosophers have held [the doctrine of] creation." If the notion of a temporal beginning is added to the meaning of creation, such that "the creature should have non-being prior to being [even] in duration, so that it is said to be 'out of nothing' because it is temporally after nothing," then, Thomas concluded, such a notion of creation cannot be demonstrated and is only held on faith. Thomas observes that there are two complementary senses of creation out of nothing: one philosophical, the other theological. The philosophical sense means that God, with no material cause, makes all things to exist as beings that are radically different from Himself and yet completely dependent upon His causality. This philosophical sense of creation has two essential elements: 1) there is no material cause in creation  no 'stuff' whatsoever out of which God makes the world; and 2) the creature is naturally nonbeing rather than being, which means that the creature is completely dependent, throughout its entire duration, upon the constant causality of the Creator. This philosophical sense of creation is the sense in which creation out of nothing can be proven by reason alone, according to Thomas. It is also this sense of creation which he thinks Aristotle demonstrates. It is not my purpose here to give in detail the argument Thomas uses to demonstrate that the world is created it is an argument based on his famous distinction between essence and existence in all created effects, and their identity in the Creator. Here, I simply want to note that Thomas speaks of creation understood philosophically, as distinct from creation understood theologically. The theological sense of creation, that sense dependent upon faith, denies nothing of the philosophical sense, and adds to it, among other things, the notion that the created universe has a temporal beginning. This theological sense of creation cannot be proven philosophically; it is known only through revelation. Thomas does not interpret the expression ex nihilo, as do so many others in the thirteenth century, necessarily to mean that God makes the being of the creature to exist temporally after nonbeing. In the theological, revealed sense of creation ex nihilo, it is true that the created world has a temporal beginning. But there is nothing in the philosophical sense of creation ex nihilo to indicate that the created world must have a temporal beginning. The analysis of creation which Thomas offers distinguishes him from Albert the Great and Bonaventure, both of whom thought that ex nihilo had to mean post nihilum: that is, they thought that if one accepted the notion of creation one had to accept the notion of a temporal beginning of the world. Albert comments that "[w]hen it is said, 'the creature comes to be from nothing,' it is clear that the preposition 'from' indicates an order of duration of that which is nothing to the creature, such that the nothing is a privation of the entire being of a creature, including its duration." Thomas' position distinguishes him, as well, from Henry of Ghent, one of the theologians who helped to compile the list of propositions condemned by Bishop Tempier. Henry was especially critical of Thomas' claim that a universe, created and eternal, was in any sense possible. According to Henry, the "created world can only have being as an effect" if its non-being precedes its being "in temporal duration." For Thomas, the theological sense of creation, known fully only through faith, did affirm that ex nihilo meant post nihilum. It is the genius of his analysis, however, that he distinguishes between what faith reveals and what reason concludes about creation. It is his exposition of the philosophical sense of creation which characterizes his special contribution to the debate in the thirteenth century. A key feature of Aquinas' analysis is his understanding that creation is not a change; there is no becoming that precedes the being of the creature, or, as he often says: creatio non est mutatio [creation is not a change]. There is no prior matter, nor any prior passive potentiality, which is transformed or made into the creature. Thomas recognizes a debt to Avicenna who had distinguished between two kinds of agent causes: an agent which acts through motion, and a divine agent which is "a giver of being:" " . . . the metaphysicians do not intend by the agent the principle of movement only, as do the natural philosophers, but also the principle of existence and that which bestows existence, such as the creator of the world." Such a divine agent needs only the power to create  and nothing else. It is true with respect to natural agents that something cannot be produced from nothing; that is, any change requires a prior something to be changed: all change involves a material cause. Creation ex nihilo does not contradict the principles of Aristotelian physics -- or of the contemporary natural sciences, for that matter; it does not challenge, for example, the principle that something must always come from something. The principles of the natural sciences concern change and changing things, and creation is not a change; it is the metaphysical dependence of the creature upon the creator for its very existence. The distinction between creation and change appears frequently in the writings of Thomas, as well as in the other major thinkers of the thirteenth century. It is a crucial distinction, perhaps the crucial distinction on which Thomas' analysis depends. It is a distinction which he saw more clearly than his contemporaries. As Thomas remarks in his treatise, De substantiis separatis [c. 9]: "Over and above the mode of becoming by which something comes to be through change or motion, there must be a mode of becoming or origin of things without any mutation or motion, through the influx of being." God does not change "nothing" into something. Rather, were God's not causing all that is, there would be nothing at all. In his most sophisticated discussion of the intelligibility of an eternal world, De aeternitate mundi, Thomas concludes: "Thus it is evident that the statement that something was made by God and nevertheless was never without existence, does not involve any logical contradiction."  SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1Neither from the point of view of what it means to be a creature, nor from the point of view of what it means for God to create, can one reach a demonstrative conclusion about the temporal duration of the world. For Thomas it is intelligible to say that something could be made, and completely made, but that the non-being of the thing made not precede temporally the being of the thing made. To say that God creates "out of nothing" is to recognize that there is no material cause in creation and no restriction of any sort on God抯 act. On the side of the creature, creation is fundamentally a relation of dependence. The creature is completely dependent upon the creative cause of its existence such that, were God to stop creating, the creature would utterly cease existing. Thus, even if the universe had no temporal beginning, it still would depend upon God for its very being. The radical dependence on God as cause of being is what creation means. The question of a temporal beginning is irrelevant to the fundamental, on-going, metaphysical fact that all creatures are absolutely dependent upon God for their complete existence. Whether the world is eternal or not concerns the kind of world there is, not whether or not it is created. Thomas, of course, believed that the universe had a temporal beginning, but, as he said in the Summa theologiae "That the world had a beginning. . . is an object of faith, but not a demonstration or science." The reason he advances here is that the world itself offers no grounds for demonstrating that it had an absolute temporal beginning. "For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing;" and every science, since its subjects are universals and not particulars, "abstracts from here and now .  SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1. . . Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man or the heavens or a stone did not always exist." Thomas often referred to those arguments which concluded that the world has an absolute temporal beginning because an eternal world would necessarily involve an actual infinity of some sort or other: either an infinite number of past days, or having to traverse an infinite temporal distance to get from some point infinitely distant in the past to the present. With the exception of arguments about an infinite number of human souls having to exist were the world eternal, he found such arguments involving the impossibility of an actual infinity not particularly compelling when applied to temporal succession. The arguments which he was especially concerned to refute, however, were those which claimed that "to be created" means to have being after non-being and that God as agent cause had to precede, in some temporal sense, what He creates. As I have already indicated, for Albert, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and others to be created is to be something new after not being at all. Or, to express this in another way, a created world must necessarily be a world that has had a temporal beginning. God could not have created an eternal world. And, as we have seen, Thomas did not consider these arguments to be demonstrative. Each time Thomas comments on the impossibility of demonstrating that the world has a temporal beginning, he observes, as he does in the Summa theologiae, that "we do well to keep this in mind; otherwise, if we presumptuously undertake to demonstrate what is of faith, we may introduce arguments that are not strictly conclusive; and this would furnish infidels with an occasion for scoffing, as they would think that we assent to truths of faith on such grounds." In defending the intelligibility of a universe created and eternal, Thomas would not deny the importance of time in the theological notion of creation. The fact, accepted only in faith, that human beings are creatures in a world that has been brought into being ab initio temporis means that we are beings with a story. For believers, this is not merely a story; it is sacred history, the history of our relationship to the God who gave us meaning and destiny from the beginning, who has intervened decisively in human history. For the believer, the temporal beginning, which is essential to salvation history, is fundamental to the understanding of creation. It is a clear revelation of the complete dependence of all that is on God. Nevertheless, a believer ought to recognize that an eternal universe would be just as much a created one. Thomas Aquinas offers us, I think, the best of the heritage of the Middle Ages on creation and temporality: philosophically and scientifically then and now, time is irrelevant to creation; theologically, time is very important to creation. He reminds us, however, as a good theologian should, of the limits of reason with respect to matters of faith. His philosophical analysis of creation can serve us well as we examine claims about the implications of contemporary cosmology and evolutionary biology for the doctrine of creation and the existence of the Creator. Thomas more general claim that faith perfects reason can be seen in his philosophical and theological accounts of creation. No matter how important the philosophical analysis is, Thomas would note that faith adds more than just extra information. In his commentary on Paul抯 second epistle to the Corinthians, Thomas says: "The knowledge of God which is had by other sciences [other than sacra doctrina] enlightens only the intellect, showing that God is the first cause; that He is one and wise, etc. But the knowledge of God had through faith both enlightens the mind and delights the affections, for it not only tells us that God is the first cause, but also that He is our Savior, that He is our Redeemer, that He loves us, that He became incarnate for us, and all this inflames the affections." Lecture 1: 2013 PAGE 1 PAGE 1 5G    , e f ,  >  ? 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